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The core convergence theorem is an important cornerstone of the relationship
between the predictions of game theory in large economies and competitive
equilibrium allocations. Many results have followed the seminal works of
Debreu and Scarf (1963) and Aumann (1964); see Anderson (2008) for a
recent survey. This paper focuses on interim economies with asymmetric
information, and concentrates on core concepts that model the endogenous
information transmission that goes on within each coalition. In particular,
three core concepts will feature prominently in the paper: the credible core
found in Dutta and Vohra (2005), the virtual utility core of Myerson (2007),
and the randomized mediated core of Serrano and Vohra (2007).
The core convergence question in the ex-ante stage (i.e., that in which
no agent has received any private information) has also been studied. For
this stage, if no restrictions are imposed on the set of allocations, the ques-
tion is simply a reformulation of the standard problem in an Arrow-Debreu
economy framework. Indeed, the most interesting cases happen when either
measurability or incentive compatibility restrictions are imposed; the reader
is referred to Forges, Minelli and Vohra (2002) for an excellent general sur-
vey of the area, and to Serrano, Vohra and Volij (2001) for a discussion.
There are also results obtained for the ex-post stage (i.e., that in which all
private information has been made common knowledge); see, for example,
Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2000).1 The results in the current paper will
connect with some of these, due to the information transmission embodied
in the interim cores we study, which place them closer to ex-post solution
concepts.
For the interim stage, the most closely related study to the current paper
is the work by Serrano, Vohra and Volij (2001). That paper studies replicas
in which the set of states of the world is not replicated with the economy,
which implies that, already in the second replica, the economy is one of
non-exclusive information in the sence of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986)
and incentive constraints become redundant. The general message of that
paper is a robust failure of the core convergence theorem in these settings
(this applies to several versions of the interim core and the interim price
1These authors work with atomless economies, although they assume the number of
states is ﬁnite. If we tried to extend our analysis to atomless economies, the state space
would also be “atomless.” Then, it would be diﬃcult to deﬁne the joint information of a
coalition, for example, hindering the use of the arguments in that paper.
1equilibrium). Essentially, for cores that use a limited amount of exogenously
speciﬁed information transmission (e.g., the coarse core of Wilson (1978)),
the core is “too large” and does not shrink down to the set of price allocations;
and the core that allows unrestricted communication (Wilson’s ﬁne core) is
often “too small,” even empty, still when price allocations can be supported.
In the current paper, we shall consider independent replicas, those intro-
duced in Gul and Postlewaite (1992) and also studied in Forges, Heifetz and
Minelli (2001). Independent replicas also replicate the states of the world,
and in them, each agent’s preferences depend only on the information per-
tinent to his replica. We shall concentrate on economies in which the state
is not veriﬁable ex-post, and thus, incentive constraints become important.
For these economies, some recent papers have proposed core notions in which
communication within coalitions is endogenous; these core notions take cen-
ter stage in our study and we describe them in the sequel.2
The credible core, proposed in Dutta and Vohra (2005), is the set of
incentive compatible allocations immune to credible objections. A coalition
has a credible objection if it can identify an informational event such that
the types of agents involved in the event are the only ones that prefer the
alternative proposed to the status quo, given that the other types behave as
prescribed in the objection. This self-selection ensures that a type wishes to
participate in the objection if and only if it is consistent with the objection’s
event. Therefore, the information transmitted in the objection via the event
is “credible” in that the types that are not part of it have no incentive to join
the objection; hence the name of the concept. Based on the virtual utility
construct, Myerson (2007) proposes a core notion that, in addition to the
credibility requirements, considers random coalition formation and random
allocations for each coalition. Finally, Serrano and Vohra (2007) set up the
Dutta-Vohra and Myerson objections as communication mechanisms played
by the agents in each coalition, and derive their objections’ inequalities from
the equilibria of such communication games. When random blockings are
possible, one diﬀerence between Myerson’s (2007) concept and that arrived
at in Serrano and Vohra (2007) had not been previously emphasized, and
such a diﬀerence plays an important role in our results. The issue concerns
the possibility of information transmission within a random blocking plan
across the diﬀerent coalitions that comprise the plan. Correspondingly, we
2In the last section, we shall discuss how our results extend to economies without
incentive constraints.
2shall talk about the credible core of Dutta-Vohra, the virtual utility core of
Myerson and the randomized utility core of Serrano-Vohra. Details will be
provided in Section 2 about these three nested sets of core allocations.
We shall assume that agents in our economies have quasilinear prefer-
ences. For this class, diﬀerent core existence results have been provided (see
Dutta and Vohra (2005), Myerson (2007)). It is important to stress that
non-emptiness is in general hard to achieve for all these core concepts once
incentive constraints are in place, as pointed out by Vohra (1999) and Forges,
Mertens and Vohra (2002). Aside non-emptiness, as the reader will appreci-
ate, some of our proofs also rely on the quasilinearity assumption. Myerson
(2007) notes that, even in quasilinear settings, random blockings make a dif-
ference to the deﬁnition of the core in the presence of asymmetric information
(unlike what is known for complete information games). The current work
shows that, even in quasilinear economies, depending on how much informa-
tion transmission one allows in random blocking plans, the answer that one
obtains to the convergence question is also very diﬀerent.
Our results show both negative and positive convergence conclusions.
First, we shall propose a simple robust example to demonstrate that Myer-
son’s (2007) virtual utility core –and thus, Dutta and Vohra’s (2005) credible
core– does not converge to any price equilibrium notion. However, if informa-
tion transmission is allowed to ﬂow within the coalitions that participate in
a given random blocking plan, as modelled in Serrano and Vohra (2007), the
equal-treatment strictly incentive compatible allocations in the randomized
mediated core converge to the set of incentive compatible ex-post Walrasian
allocations, whenever this is non-empty. The latter result may shed light on
the rather mysterious information transmission that goes on within a price
function in a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 An Interim Exchange Economy
The basic model of an exchange economy with asymmetric information that
we shall use in this paper can be formulated as follows. Let Ti denote the
(ﬁnite) set of agent i’s types. The interpretation is that ti ∈ Ti denotes
the private information possessed by agent i. With N = {1,...,n} as the
ﬁnite set of agents, let TN =
Q
i∈N Ti denote the set of all information states.





j∈S Tj and T−S =
Q
j/ ∈S Tj. We assume that agents have a common
prior probability distribution q deﬁned on TN, and that no type is redundant,
i.e., q(ti) > 0 for all ti ∈ Ti for all i. At the interim stage, nature chooses
tN ∈ TN, and each agent i knows her type, ti. Hence, conditional probabilities
will be important: for each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti, the conditional probability of
t−i ∈ T−i, given ti is denoted q(t−i | ti).
We assume that there are |L| = l, a ﬁnite number of commodities, and
that commodity L is a nummeraire. The consumption set of agent i is Xi ⊆
Rl−1
+ ×R. Agent i’s utility function in state tN is denoted ui(·,t N):Xi×TN 7→




endowment of agent i of type ti is ωi ∈ Xi (assumed to be independent of
the state – with this assumption, all private information concerns agents’
preferences and beliefs.)
We can now deﬁne an admissible exchange economy as E = h(ui,X i,ω i,
Ti)i∈N,qi.
In our analysis, the contracts will be signed at the interim stage. However,
when a coalition gets together to make a proposal to upset a given allocation,
some information may be transmitted within the members of the coalition.
We shall allow coalitions to use random incentive compatible mechanisms
(e.g., Myerson (2007), Serrano and Vohra (2007)). We begin by describing
deterministic allocation rules.
2.2 Deterministic Mechanisms
For coalition S ⊆ N, a feasible deterministic (state contingent) S-allocation,
x : TN 7→ Rls (where s denotes the cardinality of S), consists of a commodity





for all tN ∈ TN, and satisfying that x(tS,t 0
−S)=x(tS,t 00
−S) for all tS ∈ TS
and for all t0
−S,t 00
−S ∈ T−S. (The latter assumption is made to exclude basic
externalities across coalitions, i.e., the set of feasible allocations to a coalition
is independent of the information held by the complement, although this may
aﬀect the utilities of agents in the coalition). We will denote by AS the set of
feasible deterministic state contingent allocations of S. With confusion being
avoided by the context, we shall also use AS to denote the set of feasible






i∈S ωi}. Similarly, deterministic state contingent N-allocations are simply
referred to as deterministic allocations, and the set of such deterministic
4allocations is denoted by AN.
For most of this paper, we shall work in environments in which the infor-
mation state will not be veriﬁable, not even at the ex-post stage. Thus, it
becomes necessary to impose the incentive compatibility constraints into the
analysis.
We begin again by considering deterministic allocations. Then, if agent i
of type ti pretends to be of type t0










An allocation x is incentive compatible if for every i ∈ N, and for every
ti ∈ Ti,




i ∈ Ti \{ti}. We denote the set of incentive compatible allocations
by A∗
N. An allocation x is strictly incentive compatible if all these inequalities
are strict.
Information transmission concerns ruling out some states as impossible,
through the identiﬁcation of smaller events. For an event E ⊆ TN and ti ∈ Ti,
let
E−i(ti)={t−i ∈ T−i | (ti,t −i) ∈ E}
and
Ei = {ti ∈ Ti | E−i(ti) 6= ∅}.
Consider an allocation rule x ∈A N, agent i of type ti and an event E.








The corresponding interim utility (conditional on E) if type ti pretends
to be of type t0











Given E ⊆ TN,a nS-allocation x ∈A S is incentive compatible over E if for
every i ∈ S and for every ti,t 0
i ∈ Ei:




Now we expand coalitional interactions and information transmission to also
consider random plans. A random coalitional plan µ consists of a probabil-
ity distribution of feasible allocation mechanisms for various coalitions. In
particular, µ(S,yS,t N), where yS ∈A S, denotes the probability with which
coalition S ⊆ N is receiving yS ∈A S when the (reported) state is tN ∈ TN.
We shall say that such a random plan is measurable with respect to coali-
tional information, or simply measurable, if for every S, for every yS and for
every tS, µ(S,yS,(tS,t 0
−S)) = µ(S,yS,(tS,t 00
−S)) for every t0
−S,t 00
−S ∈ T−S.
Otherwise, we shall say that the random plan is non-measurable. Non-
measurabilities in this sense are in principle possible, although we shall al-
ways require that, if P is the union of all coalitions in the support of µ,
µ(S,yS,(tP,t 0
−P)) = µ(S,yS,(tP,t 00
−P)) for all (S,yS) in the support of µ, all
tP ∈ TP and all t0
−P,t 00
−P ∈ T−P. The idea is to think of the random plan
as a mediated communication mechanism used by the members of the coali-
tion; thus, information can potentially ﬂow in any possible way within the
mechanism, but only information available to someone that participates in
the random plan.
Note that, if µ(S,yS,t N) > 0 implies µ(S,zS,t N) = 0 for all zS 6= yS,w e
would associate with each coalition S one deterministic allocation yS ∈A S.
But in general a random plan may include random allocations within each
coalition, as well as random coalition formation. The plan speciﬁes for each




yS µ(S,yS,t N) ≤ 1.
For type ti of agent i, the interim utility of such a random plan µ, com-



















If everyone else is truthful and type ti pretends to be type t0
i, his interim





























Note how the type misreport aﬀects the implementation probabilities µ(·)
of each coalitional allocation and νi(·) of the status quo. In addition, it
garbles the outcomes in each yS, but not those in x. In Section 4, we shall go
over this, which is related to the timing of events in the blocking plan versus
the status quo; see also Myerson (2007) and Serrano and Vohra (2007).
A random plan µ is incentive compatible if for every i ∈ N and for every
ti,t 0
i in the support of µ:




These concepts have been used to deﬁne several versions of the core in interim
economies with asymmetric information. It is important to note that, when
coupled with an incentive compatible allocation x ∈A ∗
N, interpreted as the
status quo, a random plan trying to upset it may allow for the status quo to
prevail with some positive probability. That is, since a random plan µ against
the presence of status quo x allows for each tN ∈ TN,0≤ µ(S,yS,t N) ≤ 1 for




yS µ(S,yS,t N) ≤ 1, one must
assign the rest of probability ν(tN) to the implementation of the status quo.3
Following Myerson (2007) and Serrano and Vohra (2007), the implementation
of the status quo is not aﬀected by the reported types in the blocking plan
(we shall explain these timing issues in Section 4).
Given an incentive compatible allocation x ∈A ∗
N, a random plan µ is a
random blocking plan against x whenever for every type ti ∈ Ti:
Ui([µ/x] | ti) ≥ Ui(x | ti)
with at least one strict inequality, and





3The probabilities νi(·) that appear in the deﬁnitions of Ui([µ/x]|·), right before the
current subsection, are simply the marginals of ν. Also, when the appropriate payoﬀ
inequalities are imposed versus a given status quo, one describes a “blocking plan” used
in the deﬁnition and characterization of the inner core; see Myerson (1991), Qin (1993)
and de Clippel and Minelli (2005).
7Equivalently, one can normalize probabilities and simplify these inequal-











i (tN),t N) − ui(xi(tN),t N)] ≥ 0( ∗)



























i),t N) − ui(xi(tN),t N)]
for all i ∈ N and ti,t 0
i ∈ Ti.( ∗∗)
The following are the deﬁnitions of the core that will concern us here:
An incentive compatible allocation x ∈A ∗
N is in the credible core (Dutta
and Vohra (2005)) if there does not exist a random blocking plan µ against x
such that µ(S,yS,t N) > 0 only for one coalition S and one deterministic rule
yS ∈A S, and for tN ∈
Q
i∈S Ei × T−S, where Ei is the set of types of agent
i in the support of µ. Note how, in particular, the deﬁnition of incentive
compatibility over an event E for an S-allocation for a ﬁxed coalition S
applies to these blocking plans, as deﬁned above.
Thus, in a credible objection to an allocation, a ﬁxed coalition S identiﬁes
an information event over which the objection takes place. All the types
consistent with that event prefer the objection to the status quo allocation
after Bayesian updating of their beliefs given the event. Furthermore, no type
within the relevant event wants to misrepresent its information. Finally, the
types not consistent with the event do not wish to participate in the objection
by pretending they are one of the types in it: to see this, in the second
condition of a random blocking plan, suppose ti is one of these excluded
types and t0
i one of the types in the support of µ. The latter is what is
called the credibility restriction in this objection. Hence the name credible
objection.
If in a credible objection one drops the credibility restriction, one con-
structs a ﬁne objection. The ﬁne core is the set of allocations x ∈A N immune
to ﬁne objections (Wilson (1978)).
An incentive compatible allocation x ∈A ∗
N is in the virtual utility core
(Myerson (2007)) if there does not exist a random blocking plan µ against x
that is measurable.
8Thus, in these objections, an agent is invited to the blocking plan, but
he is not told which speciﬁc coalition is being formed. Each agent in the
support of µ gets a phone call inviting him to participate in the blocking
plan, and those “phone calls” are made according to µ. On the basis of µ,
contingent on the “phone call,” each agent updates his interim beliefs using
Bayes’ rule. Again, given this, each agent who gets the call wishes to go along
with it instead of remaining at the status quo, and the appropriate incentive
compatibility constraints are also imposed given µ. The measurability of
the plan implies that a given coalition S cannot be called with diﬀerent
probabilities in two states (tS,t 0
−S) and (tS,t 00
−S) that the coalition cannot
discern.
An incentive compatible allocation x ∈A ∗
N is in the randomized mediated
core (Serrano and Vohra (2007)) if there does not exist a random blocking
plan µ against x.
For these objections, the same story applies, except that the non-measurability
of µ allows for information transmission across coalitions within the blocking
plan; see Section 4 for details.
Observation: The randomized mediated core is a subset of the virtual
utility core, itself a subset of the credible core. Also, an incentive compatible
allocation that is in the ﬁne core is in the credible core.
Under the assumptions made so far, and if one allows average feasibility
in the nummeraire (while exact feasibility is required for the other commodi-
ties), Myerson (2007) establishes the non-emptiness of the virtual utility core.
Furthermore, his existence argument does not use at all the measurability
of blocking plans. Therefore, it follows that, under exactly the same as-
sumptions, the randomized mediated core is also non-empty. An alternative
approach to non-emptiness is provided in Dutta and Vohra (2005). In quasi-
linear economies, assuming that there exists an incentive compatible ex-post
core allocation, they show that the credible core is non-empty. It is easy to
complete their argument to show that the randomized mediated core is also
non-empty (see the proof of our Proposition 2).
To further appreciate the information transmission that goes on within
each blocking plan, the reader is referred to Serrano and Vohra (2007). In
that paper, each blocking plan is set up as a voting game among the players,
who have to report their private information and choose whether they vote
for the blocking plan or stay with the status quo. In the equilibria of these
voting games, each agent performs the correct updating of his interim beliefs,
using Bayes’ rule and the equilibrium actions of the other types in the game.
92.5 Replica Economies
The current paper is concerned with core convergence. Thus, we turn to
deﬁne the replicas of the basic economies and allocations. We shall use the
independent replicas introduced in Gul and Postlewaite (1992), also used in
Forges, Heifetz and Minelli (2001). Each agent’s utility depends only on the
information contained in his replica. Because replicas are independent, the
set of states in the replicated economy is the product of the sets of states for
each replica.
Formally, given an economy E = h(ui,X i,ω i,T i)i∈N,qi, and an allocation
x ∈A N, replicas of E and x are deﬁned as follows. For every positive integer
m, let Im = {1,2,...,m}. The m-th replica of E is the economy Em =
h(u(i,j),X (i,j),ω (i,j),T (i,j))(i,j)∈N×Im,q mi, where for all (i,j) ∈ N ×Im, X(i,j) =
Xi, T(i,j) = Ti over
Q
k6=i T(k,j), ω(i,j) = ωi, u(i,j) = ui : Xi ×
Q
i∈N T(i,j) 7→ R,
and




The m-th replica of x is denoted xm where xm
(i,j) = xi for all (i,j) ∈ N ×Im.4
Note that the set of information states changes with replication. This is
diﬀerent from the replication process of Serrano, Vohra and Volij (2001),
which results in information becoming non-exclusive already in the second
replica. This in turn makes incentive constraints redundant.
2.6 Market Equilibrium
The competitive market equilibrium concept that we shall employ in this
paper is the ex-post Walrasian equilibrium, and we shall assume that there
exists an ex-post Walrasian equilibrium allocation that is incentive compat-
ible. Under this assumption, our negative convergence result extends also
to any price-taking equilibrium concept that satisﬁes Property P, as ﬁrst
suggested in Serrano, Vohra and Volij (2001):
A price-taking equilibrium concept is said to obey Property P if, whenever
it is non-empty, in an economy that includes some fully informed agents, each
of them receives in equilibrium a bundle that maximizes his ex-post utility
over his ex-post budget constraint.
4We shall sometimes ﬁnd it convenient to refer to consumer (i,j) ∈ N×Im as consumer
ij.
103 The Non-Convergence Result
In the current section we show that, even if one restricts attention to replicas
of allocations, i.e., even if one assumes equal treatment of agents across
replicas, the virtual utility core does not converge to price-taking equilibrium
allocations, no matter how many times the economy is replicated. Later in
this section we shall argue that the core of any replicated economy may in
addition contain allocations that violate equal treatment.
3.1 Equal Treatment Allocations
Our ﬁrst result follows:
Proposition 1 There exists an allocation ˜ x in an admissible economy E
satisfying that for every m, ˜ xm is in the virtual utility core of the replicated
economy Em and that cannot be supported by any price-taking equilibrium
notion that obeys Property P.
Proof: Consider the following economy E. There are two consumers and two
commodities. Suppose T1 = {s,t} while agent 2 is uninformed (and therefore
has only one type). The information state can then be described by s or t.
Suppose s and t are equally probable. Let ω1 = ω2 =( 1 .5,1). The utility
functions are as follows:
u1(x1,x 2,s)=l nx1 + x2,u 2(x1,x 2,s)=2l nx1 + x2,
u1(x1,x 2,t)=2l nx1 + x2,u 2(x1,x 2,t)=l nx1 + x2.
(Recall that throughout we use superscripts to index commodities and sub-
scripts to index consumers.) Thus, the two individuals are ex ante identical,
but the realized type of individual 1 determines ex post which of the two has
a higher utility from consumption of the ﬁrst good.5
We consider ﬁrst the allocation ˆ x deﬁned by:
ˆ x1(s)=( 1 ,1.5), ˆ x2(s)=( 2 ,0.5);
ˆ x1(t)=( 2 ,0.5), ˆ x2(t)=( 1 ,1.5).
5This example was ﬁrst proposed in Kreps (1977) to illustrate how the set of rational
expectations equilibria might be empty. It was also used in Forges, Heifetz and Minelli
(2001) to show that the equal treatment property does not hold for the ex ante incentive
compatible core in the two-fold replicated economy.
11Then each agent’s ex post utility is:
u1(ˆ x1(s),s)=1 .5,u 2(ˆ x2(s),s)=2l n2+0 .5,
u1(ˆ x1(t),t)=2l n2+0 .5,u 2(ˆ x2(t),t)=1 .5.
Note how ˆ x must be the only allocation prescribed by an equilibrium con-
cept that obeys Property P in this economy. Note also how many equilibrium
concepts will obey this property here, including the ex-post Walrasian equi-
librium, the constrained market equilibrium found in Wilson (1978), or the
rational expectations equilibrium (which here yields the empty set). Finally,
observe that ˆ x is incentive compatible.
To construct the allocation we are interested in, we modify ˆ x by requiring
an additional transfer of 0.05 units of good 2 from individual 2 to individual
1 in each state. We denote the resulting allocation as ˜ x:
˜ x1(s)=( 1 ,1.55), ˜ x2(s)=( 2 ,0.45);
˜ x1(t)=( 2 ,0.55), ˜ x2(t)=( 1 ,1.45).
This allocation yields utility levels
u1(˜ x1(s),s)=1 .55,u 2(˜ x2(s),s)=2l n2+0 .45,
u1(˜ x1(t),t)=2l n2+0 .55,u 2(˜ x2(t),t)=1 .45.
We consider now the independent replication process described above.
Recall that we denote individual i in the j-th replica as (i,j). We present
our argument in two claims.
Claim 1.1: For all m, both the m-th replicated allocations ˆ xm and ˜ xm are in
the credible core of Em.
Proof of Claim 1.1: We will show that the m-th replication of ˜ x is in the
credible core of the replicated economy Em. (The argument for ˆ xm is similar
and we omit it.)
Since we can check that ˜ xm is incentive compatible (each informed agent
in each replica does not wish to pretend that he is of the other informed
type), it suﬃces to show that ˜ xm is in the ﬁne core of Em; see Dutta and
Vohra (2005).
It is easy to show that ˜ x is maximizing the sum of ex-post utilities for each
state and it is ex-post individually rational. Hence, ˜ x is in the ﬁne core of
the original economy E. Thus, for j =1 ,2,...,m, if the allocation is blocked
12by a coalition S that includes both (1,j) and (2,j), then the allocation is
also blocked by S \{ (1,j),(2,j)}. This implies that it is suﬃcient to check
whether coalition S = {(1,1),...,(1,k),(2,k+1 ) ,...,(2,m)} blocks the
allocation ˜ xm for each m and k(0 ≤ k ≤ m). For this possible blocking




j=k+1 T(1,j), where r(1,j) = s or t(1 ≤ j ≤ k).
Without loss of generality, we may assume that
r(1,j) =
(
s (1 ≤ j ≤ j0)
t (j0 +1≤ j ≤ k)
for some j0(0 ≤ j0 ≤ k). Here, j0 =0 ( j0 = k) means that r(1,j) = t(s) for
every (1,j)(1 ≤ j ≤ k), respectively.
Note that any feasible allocation for coalition S has to be constant on E,
i.e., each uninformed agent must receive the same bundle in both relevant
states. It follows from the quasilinearity that the optimal allocation of good






































λ (1 ≤ j ≤ j0)
2λ (j0 +1≤ j ≤ k) ,x
1




j0 +2 ( k − j0)+1 .5(m − k)
=
1.5m
1.5m +0 .5k − j0.
Then the sum of interim utilities is
j
0 · lnλ +( k − j
0) · 2ln(2λ)+( m − k) · 1.5ln(1.5λ)+m. (1)
On the other hand, the sum of interim utilities of the original allocation
˜ xm for the coalition is
1.55j




{(2ln2 + 0.45) + 1.45}·(m − k). (2)
13Now it suﬃces to show that (2)−(1) is non-negative for all m,k(0 ≤ k ≤
m) and j0(0 ≤ j0 ≤ k). We denote the diﬀerence [(2) − (1)] as g(j0,k,m).
For ﬁxed k and m(0 ≤ k ≤ m), the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to
the variable j0 is
ln(1.5m) − ln(1.5m +0 .5k − j
0).
Thus the function g is minimized at j0 =0 .5k. Then
g(0.5k,k,m)=1 .05k +( l n2+0 .95)(m − k) − 1.5(m − k)ln1.5 − m
= (ln2 − 1.5ln1.5 − 0.05)(m − k)+0 .05k ≥ 0
(since ln2 − 1.5ln1.5 − 0.05 > 0 and m ≥ k ≥ 0). Therefore, g(j0,k,m) ≥ 0
for every j0,kand m(0 ≤ k ≤ m,0 ≤ j0 ≤ k). Thus, the proof of Claim 1.1
is complete.
Claim 1.2: For all m, both the m-th replicated allocations ˆ xm and ˜ xm are in
the virtual utility core of Em.
Proof of Claim 1.2: We will show that the m-th replication of ˜ x is in the
virtual utility core of the replicated economy Em. (The argument for ˆ xm is
similar and we omit it.)
In the proof of Claim 1.1, we have argued that the m-th replication of ˜ x
is in the ﬁne core. Therefore, we have shown that for all S ⊆ N × Im, all













(Recall that qm is the probability distribution over the states in the replicated
economy Em). The earlier inequality corresponds to a ﬁne objection in which
all information within the coalition is transmitted to its members. Now,
consider a random plan µ that satisﬁes T S-measurability. This inequality
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which contradicts the inequality in the previous paragraph.
Claims 1.1 and 1.2 complete the proof of Proposition 1.
3.2 Non-Equal Treatment Allocations
In this subsection we demonstrate that the virtual utility core of replicated
economies also contains allocations that violate equal treatment across repli-
cas, even if the economy is replicated an arbitrary number of times.
Indeed, in the same economy used in the proof of Proposition 1, consider
the allocation (ˆ x,...,ˆ x, ˜ x). We shall show that this allocation belongs to the
virtual utility core of the (m+1)-fold replicated economy Em+1 for all m ≥ 1.
That is, in the ﬁrst m replicas, the bundles in ˆ x are allocated, whereas those
in ˜ x are assigned in the last replica, thereby violating the equal treatment
property of this core.
We follow analogous steps to those in Claim 1.1, and ﬁrst show that this
allocation is in the credible core of the (m + 1)-replicated economy. Since
15we can easily check that the proposed allocation is incentive compatible, it
suﬃces to show that it is in the ﬁne core.
Now we make the following observations:
Observation 1. For each state, both ˆ x and ˜ x are maximizing the sum of ex
post utilities. Both allocations are in the ﬁne core of the original economy.
Observation 2. For k =1 ,2,...,m,m+ 1, if the allocation is blocked by a
coalition S that includes both (1,k) and (2,k), then the allocation is also
blocked by S \{ (1,k),(2,k)}.
Observation 3. For k =1 ,2,...,m, if the allocation is blocked by a coalition
that includes (2,k) but does not include (1,k), then the allocation is also
blocked by the coalition that includes (1,k) but does not include (2,k)( b y
symmetry of allocation ˆ x).
From these observations, we can say that it is suﬃcient to check whether
coalition S is one of two possibilities: indeed, either S = {(1,1),...,(1,m),
(2,m+1)} or S = {(1,1),...,(1,m),(1,m+1)} block the proposed allocation
for each m.
For the ﬁrst possible blocking coalition, we can conﬁne our attention to
events of the form E =
Q
i∈S{ri}×T−S, where ri = s or t(i ∈ S\{(2,m+1)}).
Without loss of generality, we may assume that
r(1,i) =
(
s (1 ≤ i ≤ j)
t (j +1≤ i ≤ m)
for some j(0 ≤ j ≤ m). Here, j =0 ( j = m) means that the types of all
individuals in S \{ (2,m+1 ) } are s (t), respectively.
Note that any feasible allocation has to be constant on E and utility of
every individual other than (2,m+ 1) is determined on E. It follows from






























(2,m+1) ≤ 1.5(m +1 ) .





λ (1 ≤ i ≤ j)
2λ (j +1≤ i ≤ m)
16and x1
(2,m+1) =1 .5λ, where
λ =
1.5(m +1 )
j +2 ( m − j)+1 .5
.
Then the sum of interim utilities is:
j · lnλ +( m − j) · 2ln(2λ)+1 .5ln(1.5λ)+( m +1 ) . (3)
On the other hand, the sum of interim utilities of the original allocation
is:
1.5j +( 2l n2+0 .5)(m − j)+
1
2
{(2ln2 + 0.45) + 1.45}. (4)
Now it suﬃces to show that (4)−(3) is non-negative for all m and j(0 ≤
j ≤ m). We write the diﬀerence:
1.5j +( 2l n2+0 .5)(m − j)+
1
2
{(2ln2 + 0.45) + 1.45}
− [j · lnλ +( m − j) · 2ln(2λ)+1 .5ln(1.5λ)+( m + 1)]
Take partial derivative with respect to j:
1 − 2ln2− lnλ + 2ln(2λ) − (2m − j +1 .5)[∂ lnλ/∂j]
=1 + l n λ − (2m − j +1 .5)[∂ lnλ/∂j]
=l n λ =l n [
1.5m +1 .5
2m − j +1 .5
],
which vanishes at j =0 .5m, is negative for j<0.5m and positive thereafter.
Therefore, it suﬃces to check the value of the function at j =0 .5m for a
ﬁxed m:
0.75m +( 2l n2+0 .5)(0.5m)+
1
2
{(2ln2 + 0.45) + 1.45}
−[(0.5m) · 2ln2+1.5ln(1.5 )+( m + 1)]
=l n 2 m +
1
2
{(2ln2 + 0.45) + 1.45}−[(0.5m) · 2ln2+1.5ln(1.5) + 1]
=l n 2 m +l n2+0 .95 − [ln2m +1 .5ln(1.5) + 1]
=l n 2 − 0.05 − [1.5ln(1.5)] = 0.0340... > 0.
Since this value is independent of m, we have shown that for all j satis-
fying that 0 ≤ j ≤ m for all m ≥ 1, the diﬀerence (4)−(3) is positive, which
contradicts that the coalition blocks the original allocation.
17If the blocking coalition contains agent (1,m+ 1) instead of (2,m+ 1),
one can have two cases:
First, it is agent (1,m+ 1) in state s. We write the utility diﬀerence,
similar to (4) − (3), for this case:
1.5j +( 2l n2+0 .5)(m − j)+1 .55
− [(j +1 )· lnλ +( m − j) · 2ln(2λ)+( m + 1)]
and now λ =( 1 .5m +1 .5)/(2m − j + 1).
Again, we partially diﬀerentiate the aggregate utility diﬀerence with re-
spect to j:
1 − 2ln2 + lnλ +2l n2− (2m − j + 1)[∂ lnλ/∂j]
=l nλ = ln[
1.5m +1 .5
2m − j +1
],
which vanishes at j =0 .5m − 0.5, is negative if j<0.5m − 0.5 and positive
thereafter.
We thus check the value of the aggregate utility diﬀerence at j =0 .5m−
0.5:
1.5(0.5m − 0.5 )+( 2l n2+0 .5)(0.5m +0 .5) + 1.55
−[(0.5m +0 .5)2ln2 + (m + 1)]
=0 .75m − 0.75 + ln2(m +1 )+0 .25m +0 .25 + 1.55 − [(m + 1)(1 + ln2)]
=0 .05 > 0,
and also independent of m, so we are also done with this case. Finally, we
have case 2: agent (1,m+1) acts in state t. The utility diﬀerence similar to
(2)−(1) is now:
1.5j +( 2l n2+0 .5)(m − j)+2l n2+0 .55
− [j · lnλ +( m +1− j) · 2ln(2λ)+( m + 1)],
where now λ =( 1 .5m +1 .5)/(2m − j + 2).
Diﬀerentiating partially with respect to j, one gets:
1 − 2ln2− [lnλ − 2ln(2λ)+( 2 m − j + 2)(∂ lnλ/∂j)]
= −2ln2− [lnλ − 2ln(2λ)]
=l n λ =l n [
1.5m +1 .5
2m − j +2
],
18which vanishes at j =0 .5m+0.5, is negative at j<0.5m+0.5, and positive
thereafter. Therefore, it suﬃces to check the value of the aggregate utility
diﬀerence at j =0 .5m +0 .5:
1.5(0.5m +0 .5) + (2ln2 + 0.5)(0.5m − 0.5)
+2ln2 + 0.55 − [(m + 1)(ln2 + 1)]
=0 .05 > 0,
also independent of m.
Thus, now the proof is complete. No such blocking coalition exists and
the proposed allocation is in the incentive compatible ﬁne core, and hence,
also in the credible core.
The arguments to show that the allocation is in the virtual utility core
are similar to the inequalities derived in Claim 1.2, and we therefore omit
them.
4 Convergence of the Randomized Mediated
Core
In this section we show that the equal treatment allocations of the random-
ized mediated core converge to the set of ex-post Walrasian allocations as
the economy is replicated enough times. We do not know whether the as-
sumption of equal treatment is important to obtain this result; we have not
been able to either prove it or disprove it.
We begin by devoting some space to the issue of timing of actions in the
random allocation cores studied in this paper (the arguments also apply to
Myerson’s virtual utility core, since the measurability of the blocking plans
is not important for this).
4.1 Timing in Random Blockings
Following Myerson (2007), the discussions of a blocking plan against a sta-
tus quo in a context of incomplete information take place after the truthful
reports for the status quo have occurred, but before the implementation of
such a status quo. Therefore, one can specify the following timing of actions
within the blocking plan µ against an incentive compatible x:
19• Stage 0: types are reported to sustain x as an incentive compatible
allocation. These type reports will be used every time the status quo
needs to be implemented, and their reports are made with indepen-
dence of any potential blocking plan (if this is not the case and there
is complete forward-looking behavior, i.e., agents envisioning each pos-
sible blocking plan before they report their types to sustain the status
quo, one would arrive at a concept far aﬁeld from the core).
• Stage 1: this and the next stages describe the timing of actions within
the blocking plan µ itself. Types are reported again after players have
been informed about µ. Each player is only informed about the in-
stances in which µ calls him to act. The type reports of this stage
are used only if and when the blocking plan is implemented, and thus,
the conditioning used in the equations of the deﬁnition of a random
blocking plan (equation (**) in Section 2) is correct.
• Stage 2: phone calls are made by the blocking mediator, taking into
account the probabilities µ(S,yS,t N), which use already the correct
types reported within µ. Note in particular how a non-measurable plan
is perfectly possible, allowing information transmission from coalition
to coalition within µ. On the other hand, the plan must be measurable
with respect to the information of the union of coalitions within µ.
• Stage 3: each agent in the support of µ is asked to either accept or
reject the blocking plan. Again, the relevant conditioning of beliefs is
as in the equations that describe the random blocking plan (equation
(*) in Section 2).
To illustrate the concept of randomized mediated core, we shall consider
again the economy in the proof of Claim 1.1. Indeed, we show now that ˜ x,
which was shown to be in the virtual utility core, is not in the randomized
mediated core.
Example 1 Consider the economy in the proof of Proposition 1. First, note
that the second replication of ˜ x is not in the ex-post core. For instance, it
is blocked by coalition S = {(2,1),(1,2),(2,2)} in state (s,s) (this notation
means that for each of the two replicas the type of individual 1 is s). We
denote an ex-post blocking allocation bundle for S as yS(s,s).
20For coalition S0 = {(1,1),(2,1)}, we deﬁne an allocation bundle yS0
(s,s)
as follows: yS0
(1,1)(s,s)=( 1 ,1.56) and yS0
(2,1)(s,s)=( 2 ,0.44), which can be
obtained from ˜ x(s) by an additional transfer of 0.01 units of commodity 2
from individual (2,1) to individual (1,1).
Then, we consider the following blocking plan µ: µ(S,yS,(s,s)) = 1−ε (ε
being a very small positive number), µ(S0,yS0
,(s,s)) = ε, and µ(T,yT,r)=0
for all coalitions T and states r 6=( s,s). Then, the blocking plan µ makes
all individuals involved better oﬀ. (Choosing ε suﬃciently small, individual
(2,1) is better oﬀ. Because agent (1,1) only participates in the blocking plan
with probability ε, in the event he receives the phone call from the blocking
mediator, he accepts the plan because he also improves. Implicitly, he believes
that the status quo is still available in the event he is not part of the blocking
plan, and under these beliefs, types are reported truthfully to the blocking
plan.)6 Finally, it is easy to choose yS(s,s) appropriately to ensure that the
blocking plan satisﬁes incentive compatibility.
4.2 Equilibrium Inclusion in the Core
In this subsection we show that, in our domain of quasilinear economies, the
set of ex-post Walrasian allocation rules that are incentive compatible is in
the randomized mediated core.
Proposition 2 Consider a quasilinear exchange economy E in our admissi-
ble class. Let x∗ be an ex-post Walrasian equilibrium allocation rule satisfying
incentive compatibility. Then, for all m, x∗m is in the randomized mediated
core.
Proof: By hypothesis, x∗ is incentive compatible. So we need to show that
there does not exist any random blocking plan that improves upon x∗m.
Since an ex-post Walrasian allocation is an element of the ex-post core,











6These “infeasible beliefs” are part of equations (*) and (**), and concern both the
virtual utility core and the randomized mediated core, which, as we are showing, have
very diﬀerent convergence properties. Similar infeasible beliefs also occur in the blockings
used in the inner core with complete information (see, e.g., Myerson (1991, p. 462–468)).
21This corresponds to an ex-post objection. Now, consider a random plan µ
(without measurability). This inequality implies that for all S ⊆ N ×Im, all












































































which contradicts the inequality in the previous paragraph.
Remark: Note the parallel steps followed by the proofs of Claim 1.2 and of
Proposition 2. There is an important diﬀerence, though. While the allocation
˜ xm of the proof of Claim 1.2 is in the ﬁne core of every replica, x∗m is in the
ex-post core of every replica. This diﬀerence matters: in the former case,
the non-existence of a ﬁne objection leads, through the use of measurable
blocking plans, to the non-existence of an objection in the sense of the virtual
utility core. In the case of the latter, not having ex-post objections in any
state leads, through the use of (measurable or not) blocking plans, to the
non-existence of an objection in the sense of the randomized mediated core.
4.3 Convergence
Next, we show that the equal-treatment strictly incentive compatible alloca-
tions in the randomized mediated core converge, as the economy is replicated
22enough times, to the set of incentive compatible ex-post Walrasian alloca-
tions.
Proposition 3 Suppose that, in every ex-post state, the assumptions to ob-
tain the core convergence theorem of Debreu and Scarf (1963) are satisﬁed.
Then, if x is a strictly incentive compatible allocation rule in the economy E
and its replica xm is in the randomized mediated core of Em for every m, x
must be an ex-post Walrasian allocation rule.
Proof: Suppose not. That is, let x be a strictly incentive compatible alloca-
tion rule whose replica is in the randomized mediated core of every replicated
economy, but suppose that x(tN) is not a Walrasian allocation for some tN.
We shall show that there exists a random blocking plan that improves upon
x for some replica of the original economy.
By Debreu and Scarf (1963), there exists m such that in the m-th repli-
cation of the ex-post economy in tN, there exists a coalition S and a feasible
plan yS ∈A S, S ⊆ N × Im, such that ui(yS
i (¯ tm),t N) >u i(xi(tN),t N) for all
i ∈ S, where ¯ tm := (tN,t N,...,t N). Consider another allocation rule x0 ar-
bitrarily close to x, also strictly incentive compatible, satisfying that xi = x0
i
for all i/ ∈ S.
For this m, let us consider the following blocking plan µ for N × Im:
µ(S,yS(¯ tm),¯ tm)=ε>0,µ(N × Im,(x0(tN))m,¯ tm)=1 − ε>0 (where
(x0(tN))m represents the m-th replication of x0(tN)) and µ assigns zero for
any other state.
Since x0 satisﬁes incentive compatibility, we can see that both conditions
(*) and (**) of Section 2 are satisﬁed for any i not in S.F o ri ∈ S, conditions
(*) are clearly satisﬁed. For the conditions (**) –incentive compatibility–,
one has two cases:
Case 1: Agent i’s true type is ti and he reports t0
i. Then, the LHS
of (**) is, because of the state probability, approximately proportional to
ε[ui(yS
i (¯ tm),t N) − ui(x(tN),t N)] > 0, while the RHS is 0.
Case 2: Agent i’s true type is t0
i and he reports ti. Let t0 := (t0
i,t N\{i}).
Then, the LHS of (**) is 0, whereas the RHS is proportional to ε[ui(yS
i (¯ tm),t 0)
−ui(x(t0),t 0)] + (1 − ε)[ui(x0
i(tN),t 0) − ui(xi(t0),t 0)].
Since ui(x0
i(tN),t 0)−ui(xi(t0),t 0) < 0 by strict incentive compatibility, by
taking ε small enough, we can obtain that the RHS is negative.
23Remark: The proof of Proposition 3 does not use the assumption that
the set of incentive compatible ex-post Walrasian allocations is non-empty.
In its absence, the proposition implies the non-existence of equal-treatment
allocations in the randomized mediated core of suﬃciently large replicas.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has oﬀered a variety of convergence results for diﬀerent core no-
tions in quasilinear economies. The main factor that accounts for the diﬀer-
ence in results is the amount of information transmission that one permits
each coalition to use. If random coalition formation is possible and infor-
mation can be used, within a blocking plan, from coalition to coalition in
the plan, a positive convergence result was obtained to the set of incentive
compatible ex-post Walrasian allocations, whenever this is non-empty.
We ﬁnally observe that, while we have been using the incentive constraints
in our analysis –in part, because so do the cores that concerned us here–, all
our results extend to the case in which such constraints are not imposed. In
particular, the economy described in the proof of Proposition 1 still shows
that the proposed allocation remains in the core of every replica. That is,
even if non-incentive compatible random blocking plans are possible and
coalitions are allowed to use random allocations, no such blocking exists for
˜ x. Also, the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 still apply if one does not make use
of incentive compatibility constraints, to show that the corresponding version
of the randomized mediated core converges to the set of ex-post Walrasian
allocations.7
7Ignoring incentive constraints, Dutta and Vohra (2005) show that in quasilinear
economies the ex-post core is included in the ﬁne core, which is therefore non-empty.
Their argument can be extended in a straightforward way –as in the proof of our Propo-
sition 2– to show that the corresponding version of the randomized mediated core is also
non-empty in this case. See also de Clippel (2007) for a diﬀerent core convergence result
when incentive constraints are ignored.
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